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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the monitoring role of institutional investors in both mitigating the degree of downward-sticky 
CEO compensation and alleviating the undesirable effects of the sticky compensation on shareholder wealth. 
Particularly, we parallel the literature on “pay for performance” and institutional monitoring role to critically 
examine the measure of fluctuating pay-for-performance sensitivity, re-characterize the asymmetric compensation-
performance link, and then capture managerial rent extraction. We find that sticky CEO compensation is significantly 
and negatively associated with firm value. Further, we find that institutional ownership decreases the compensation 
stickiness in underperforming firms and ameliorates its value-deteriorating effect.  
 
Keywords: Pay-For-Performance Sensitivity; CEO Compensation Stickiness; Institutional Monitoring; Managerial 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
raditional agency theory has viewed performance-related compensation as important in mitigating 
conflicts of interest between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Holmstrom, 1979; Grossman & Hart, 1983; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Murphy 1998; Core, 
Holthausen & Larcker, 1999; Iyengar, Williams & Zampelli, 2005). Hence, managerial power theorists (hereafter 
“MPTs”) raise the distortion issue in the compensation-performance link (Gaver & Gaver, 1998; Adut, Cready & 
Lopez, 2003; Garvey & Milbourn, 2006; Jackson, Lopez & Reitenga, 2008; Fang, 2009; Wenliang, Hong & Peixian, 
2011; Chen, Liu & Peng, 2014b). They draw on the worldwide, pervasive phenomenon of downward-sticky 
performance-related compensation: paying managers “without performance”. Unfortunately, although MPTs have 
investigated the existence of downward-sticky CEO compensation as managerial rent seeking, no evidence has been 
found on the sticky compensation effect on firm value. 
 
Monitoring by institutional investors is well recognized as a corporate governance mechanism playing a potentially 
important role in shaping the compensation-performance link. Hartzell and Starks (2003) examine the institutional 
monitoring roles on executive compensation,1 finding a strong association between the concentration of institutional 
investors and pay-for-performance sensitivity (hereafter “PPS”).2 A stream of subsequent studies on the relationship 
between monitoring institutions and PPS in listed firms in the United States (e.g., Almazan, Hartzell & Starks, 2005; 
Van Essen, Otten & Carberry, 2015), United Kingdom (Ozkan, 2011), and Australia (Schultz, Tian & Twite, 2013) 
provide evidence consistent with the findings of Hartzell and Starks (2003).3 Their theoretical underpinning seems 
dependent on the active monitoring hypothesis, first formalized by Shleifer and Vishny (1986). Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986) find that institutional shareholders have strong intention to monitor corporate performance through their voting 
right. Consistent with Shleifer and Vishny (1986), subsequent empirical studies explore the association between 
monitoring institutions and firm value, and indicate a positive link between them in the United States (McConnell & 
                                                             
1 Following Hartzell and Starks (2003), Almazan et al. (2005) discover a relationship between institutions’ influence on executive compensation 
sensitivity and the level of compensation when institutions have lower monitoring costs. 
2 From a different angle, Zeng, Yuan, and Zhang (2011) investigate the effect of institutional shareholdings on executive compensation structures, 
which mitigate agency problems between majority and minority shareholders in China. 
3 In contrast, Jiang, Habib, and Smallman (2009) provide evidence that high institutional ownership has a negative effect on PPS for the New 
Zealand equity market. They focus on New Zealand institutions’ passive monitoring role due to insufficient minority shareholder protection and 
less-stringent litigation. 
T 
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Servaes, 1990; Burkart, Gromb & Panunzi, 1997; Han & Suk, 1998; Choi & Sias 2012), Korea (Park, Jung & Lee, 
2013), Malaysia (Wahab, How & Verhoeven, 2007), and Thailand (Hsu & Wang, 2014; Thanatawee, 2014).4  
 
However, the aforementioned literature, specifically, Hartzell and Starks (2003), Almanzan, Hartzell, and Starks 
(2005), and Schultz et al. (2013), indubitably interpret increased PPS as resulting from institutional monitoring. 
However, if the change in CEO compensation has a non-linear relationship to change in performance, the average PPS 
in the prior literature is not constant. In other words, the prior PPS measure as a proxy for either low or high agency 
costs has bias because it captures, on average, both sides of the changes in performance. Moreover, a stronger PPS 
when firm performance increases (D Performance > 0) may not evidence a mitigated agency problem as it burdens 
shareholders with incremental costs. Considering the rationale provided in the literature, preventing PPS from 
decreasing when firm performance declines (D Performance < 0) may be evidence of efficient monitoring, suggesting 
that monitoring institutions control “pay without performance”. Therefore, it needs to explicitly incorporate the pay-
without-performance problem in an analytical model to investigate the monitoring effect of institutional investors. 
Thus, the limitations we have identified suggest the use of CEO compensation stickiness (hereafter “CCS”) as a 
measure to capture a manager’s rent-extraction behavior. 
 
This study first tests whether our CCS estimate negatively affects shareholder value; we then investigate whether 
institutional investors monitor downward-sticky compensation arrangements and induce managers to enhance 
shareholder wealth. Our analyses use a sample of 6,748 firm-year observations, from 1993 to 2015, in United States 
capital markets. Our first result suggests that CCS reduces shareholder value, thus implying that sticky compensation 
fails to motivate CEOs under their contracts. Next, the results report that higher institutional ownership alleviates CCS 
as well as its negative effects on firm value.  
 
Overall, this study provides new evidence on institutional investors’ monitoring role by examining not only the 
relationship between institutional ownership and CCS but also the alleviating effect of the potentially negative 
association between CCS and firm value. Our contributions are threefold. First, our paper re-characterizes the 
asymmetric compensation-performance link and convincingly describes the institutional investors’ monitoring role in 
preventing distortion of CEO compensation schemes. Second, this study complements the agency literature by 
exploring not only the value-deteriorating effect of CCS (which has become a pervasive phenomenon as an agency 
problem stemming from the extension of managerial power) but also the role of institutional owners in mitigating its 
undesirable effect on firm value.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior theories and develops our hypotheses. Section 
3 describes our sample and research designs. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes the study. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
The optimal contracting hypothesis, based on agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Holmstrom, 1979; Grossman 
& Hart, 1983; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Abowd, 1990; McConaughy & Mishra, 1996; Murphy, 1998; Core et al., 1999; 
Iyengar et al., 2005), posits that CEO compensation schemes should align with corporate performance to provide 
CEOs with efficient incentives to maximize shareholder value. By measuring PPS, Jensen and Murphy (1990) and 
Abowd (1990) find that the change of PPS is positively associated with the change in shareholder wealth. Subsequent 
studies have provided consistent evidence (e.g., Aggarwal & Samwick, 1999; McConaughy & Mishra, 1996; Iyengar 
et al., 2005; Matolcsy & Wright, 2011).  
 
While optimal contracting theorists postulate a fair-trade contract platform between the board and its executives in 
selecting pay arrangements, Crystal (1991) and Monks and Minow (2008) raise the salient point that top managers 
tend to distort the board’s role when setting CEO compensation schemes. Similarly, Newman (2000) posits that CEOs 
tend to select compensation committee members in their own best interests. The managerial power hypothesis (e.g., 
Newman, 2000; Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001; Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, 2002; Bebchuk & Fried, 2003, 2005) 
postulates that compensation schemes are likely to be shaped by managerial influence. The hypothesis explains how 
                                                             
4 In contrast, a few studies provide ambiguous or conflicting evidence regarding the monitoring improvement of institutions in relation to firm value 
(Craswell, Taylor & Saywell, 1997; Faccio & Lasfer, 2000; Navissi & Naiker, 2006; Mollah, Farooque & Karim, 2012). 
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managerial influence shapes the CEO compensation landscape, and how its influence on compensation might impose 
substantial costs on shareholders. As several researchers have recognized, some compensation arrangement features 
reflect managerial rent seeking, rather than the provision of efficient incentives (Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes & 
Shleifer, 1994; Yermack, 1997; Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001).  
 
MPTs, following managerial power hypothesis, have investigated the substantial pervasiveness of CCS (Gaver & 
Gaver, 1998; Adut et al., 2003; Garvey & Milbourn, 2006; Jackson et al., 2008; Fang, 2009; Wenliang et al., 2011; 
Chen et al., 2014b). CCS, defined as the degree to which CEO compensation is less sensitive to a decrease than an 
increase in corporate performance, is further explained as a distortion by managerial power of the board’s role in 
compensation setting especially when corporate performance worsens. The performance-related CEO compensation 
is aimed for CEOs’ incentive to be aligned with company’s performance, but it does not seem to work when the 
company performs poorly. For example, Gaver and Gaver (1998) find that CEOs in United States-listed companies 
receive a bonus when their company’s performance improves, but are not subject to penalties when their company’s 
performance declines. Subsequent studies have confirmed the stickiness characteristic of compensation (e.g., Garvey 
& Milbourn, 2006; Jackson et al., 2008). By discussing the work of Leone, Wu, and Zimmerman (2006) examining 
the link between CEO cash compensation and stock returns, Dechow (2006) addresses potential alternative 
explanations from a managerial power perspective.5 In this context, Fang (2009), Wenliang et al. (2011), Chen, Peng, 
Liu, and Xu(2014a), and Chen et al. (2014b) suggest that CEO compensation in Chinese-listed companies exhibits 
stickiness. In particular, Wenliang et al. (2011) document that executive pay has greater stickiness in firms in which 
managers have more power.  
 
While MPTs postulate that this distorted compensation-performance link burdens shareholders with excess costs 
(Gaver & Gaver, 1998; Adut et al., 2003; Garvey & Milbourn, 2006; Jackson et al., 2008; Fang, 2009; Wenliang et 
al., 2011; Chen et al., 2014a, b), little has been empirically known about the value-aggravating effects of sticky CEO 
compensation. We expect that downward-sticky compensation under firm’s unfavorable circumstances not only 
induces costly, excessive compensation, but also fails to motivate managers to work diligently, thereby ultimately 
reducing shareholder value (see HI). Thus, we propose the following: 
 
HI: Higher CEO compensation stickiness exhibits weaker stock price performance. 
 
More importantly, we are interested in institutional monitoring role in the distortion of CEO incentive arrangements. 
The corporate governance theory emphasizes that shareholders can block CEO compensation schemes that are not at 
arm’s length. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Huddart (1993), large outside shareholders, such as 
institutional investors, play a monitoring role in controlling errant management behavior. Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) 
demonstrate that independent, long-term institutions’ concentrated holdings can monitor behavior. Some papers about 
“institutional activism” argue that institutional investors actively and effectively monitor. (e.g., O’Barr & Conley, 
1992; Karpoff, 1999; Gillan & Starks2000). For example, Hartzell and Starks (2003) and Almazan et al. (2005) suggest, 
concerning institutional monitoring and executive compensation, that institutional ownership concentration is 
associated with pay-for-performance sensitivity, thereby mitigating the agency problem between shareholders and 
management. Additionally, Chung and Wang (2014) and Chung, Liu, Wang, and Zykaj (2015) find that long-term 
institutional monitoring is positively associated with a sound capital structure and strong firm performance by F-Score, 
respectively. 
 
Accordingly, institutional concentration is viewed as a strong force to control managerial influence in all facets of the 
pay-setting process.6 Increased institutional ownership confers greater power to block distorted CEO compensation 
                                                             
5 Leone et al. (2006) suggest that CEO cash compensation more sensitively reacts  to negative than positive stock returns. 
6 Relevantly, significant regulatory changes have occurred to enable shareholders to have a greater say on CEOs’ compensation, which is often 
referred to as “say-on-pay” regulation (Cai & Walking, 2011; Ertimur, Ferri & Oesch, 2013; Kimbo & Xu, 2016). Many countries and regions, 
including the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Australia, and China have introduced rules, regulations, or legislation to 
enable large shareholders to have a greater say in CEO compensation, or say-on-pay regulations, which led to increased shareholder activism. 
Due to these regulatory changes, a new stream of academic research on say-on-pay regulations has exploded in all leading academic accounting 
journals. Specifically, many studies have examined a governance mechanism related to say-on-pay regulations (Conyon & Sadler, 2010; Ferri 
& Maber, 2013; Albuquerque, Carter & Lynch, 2015; Hooghiemstra, Kuang & Qin, 2015; Alissa, 2015). However, most public firms in the 
United States have widely dispersed ownership, which makes direct contract negotiations infeasible for shareholders, and to date the shareholder 
majority vote by say-on-pay regulations may still be restrictive in the United States. 
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arrangements, particularly when the firm underperforms. Institutional investors can challenge the board’s decisions 
on downward-rigid compensation schemes by filing a derivative suit alleging that the firm has been harmed by the 
board’s decisions. Monitoring institutions can also attempt to shape CEO compensation by using their voting rights 
to reject or approve stock option plans, blocking management’s influence on the board, and thereby reducing potential 
CCS during firm underperformance (see HII-a). 
 
We further anticipate that institutional investors engage in corporate governance to enhance firm value by playing an 
active monitoring role.7 Increased institutional ownership implicitly motivates executives with reduced managerial 
power, as they are exposed to a higher dismissal risk when the firm underperforms. Higher institutional ownership 
increases the threat of derivative litigation and, in some cases, the board’s ability to vote against executive stock option 
plans when the firm underperforms.8 Related studies (Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1988; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; 
Burkart et al., 1997; Woidtke, 2002; Choi & Sias, 2012; Park et al., 2013) examine the relationship between 
institutional monitoring and firm value. For instance, Burkart et al. (1997) find that large shareholders enhance firm 
value by monitoring agencies’ errant behavior. Park et al. (2013) investigate institutional governance funds’ 
improvement effects on firm value. In this regard, institutional investors, by substituting for managerial incentives, 
may restrain stock deterioration stemming from the moral hazard problem posed by sticky pay, even though they 
cannot directly control pay without performance. Thus, the monitoring of institutional investors should alleviate the 
possibly negative effect of the compensation stickiness on firm value (see HII-b). Therefore, we propose the following: 
 
HII-a: A higher institutional concentration mitigates the degree of CEO compensation stickiness. 
 
HII-b: Institutional ownership alleviates the unfavorable relationship between the compensation stickiness and stock 
price performance. 
 
VARIABLES, METHOD, AND DATA 
 
Data 
 
Our CEO compensation data are obtained from Execucomp, an executive compensation database that reports total 
yearly salaries, bonuses, long-term incentives, stock and option grants, and other compensation for up to five top-level 
executives with at least two consecutive years of coverage. Firm characteristics are obtained from the Center for 
Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) and COMPUSTAT databases, and institutional ownership data from Thomson 
Financial, which obtains data on quarterly institutional holdings from Form 13F filings. We exclude all finance and 
utility firms (SIC codes 6000–6999 and 4900–4949) because these industries are systematically different from the 
others. After merging Execucomp’s executive compensation data, our sample consists of 6,748 firm-year observations, 
based on firms included in the S&P 1500 index, and those removed from the index, but still traded, between 1993 and 
2015.9 
 
  
                                                             
7 The growth in institutional presence can affect firms vis-à-vis their trading behavior (Siconolfi, 1992). Specifically, Frino, Jones, Lepone, and 
Wong (2014) suggest that institutional market behavior around bankruptcy announcements can potentially enhance participants’ equitable market 
practices. 
8 The board of directors is in charge of determining the top executives’ compensation structure in most public corporations.  
9 Execucomp includes only about 2,500 firms included in the S&P 1500 index, and firms excluded from the index but still traded, which limits our 
sample. 
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CCS Specifications and Consequent Firm Value 
 
Following Jackson et al. (2008), we test for the asymmetric sensitivity of CEO compensation to corporate performance 
by performing ordinary least square regressions (OLS) of change in CEO bonus compensation (DBonus) on the 
changes in return on assets and control variable.10 The estimated OLS regression model is as follows:  
 
D𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠&,( = 𝛽+ + 𝛽- × D𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐴&,( + 𝛽3 × D𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐴&,( + S𝛽4 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠&,( + 𝜀&,( (1) 
                                                   
 
where DBonusi,t is the natural logarithm of (CEO cash bonus compensation/ lagged CEO bonus) for firm i in year t; 
DPROAi,t is DROA if DROA is greater than 0 and 0 otherwise. DROA is defined as the natural logarithm of (return on 
assets / lagged return on assets) for firm i in year t where return on assets is calculated as income before extraordinary 
items divided by lagged total asset11; and DNROAi,t is DROA if DROA is less than 0 and 0 otherwise for firm i in year 
t. Thus, conditional on significantly positive coefficients of β1 and β2, a significantly smaller β2 than β1 suggests 
compensation stickiness, indicating a smaller compensation reaction when ROA decreases. Controlsi,t is defined as 
follows: 1) DASSETi,t is the natural logarithm of (book value of assets / lagged book value of assets) for firm i in year 
t; 2) DSALEi,t is the natural logarithm of (sales / lagged sales) for firm i in year t; 3) DI_ROAi,t is the industry average 
of the natural logarithm of (return on assets / lagged return on assets) for firm i in year t; 4) year-fixed effects; and 5) 
Fama-French 48 industry-fixed effects. Regarding the main controls, Schaefer (1998) demonstrates that a CEO’s pay-
performance sensitivity may decrease with firm size, merely because the relevant management team’s size decreases 
with the size of the firm. Jensen and Murphy (1990) suggest that pay-performance sensitivity is greater in a small firm 
than a large one. Murphy (1985) finds that executive pay strongly and positively relates to growth in firm sales, arguing 
that previous cross-sectional studies omitted important variables that strongly skewed their results. 
 
We then verify HII-a by adding the interaction of institutional ownership to the specification estimating the degree of 
CCS. We consider institutional investor ownership as a proxy variable capturing the intensity of institutional 
monitoring. For each firm-year observation with a corresponding CEO bonus compensation, we utilize the most recent 
quarterly institutional ownership, which is at least one year before the fiscal year-end month that the CEO 
compensation is calculated12  This tactic provides institutions sufficient time to monitor the CEO compensation 
structure. 
 
We expect the β5 coefficient in Equation 3 to be positive if pay stickiness decreases with institutional concentration, 
resulting from active monitoring of compensation arrangements by institutional shareholders: 
 
D𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠&,( = 𝛽+ + 𝛽- × D𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐴&,( + 𝛽3 × D𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐴&,( + 𝛽: × 𝐼𝑂&,( + 𝛽< × D𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐴&,( × 𝐼𝑂&,( + 𝛽= × D𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐴&,( × 𝐼𝑂&,( +∗ S𝛽4 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠&,( + 𝜀&,(  (2) 
 
where IOi,t is a dummy variable whose value is equal to 1 if total institutional ownership, calculated as the total number 
of shares held by all institutions scaled by the all outstanding shares for firm i at the end of year t – 1 , is greater than 
its mean value of our final sample and 0 otherwise; and other variables are as defined in Equation (1). 
 
Next, we process empirical models that relate sticky CEO compensation to Tobin’s Q (TobinQ) and stock returns 
(Return), respectively, to test HI. We modify Easton and Harris’ (1991) regression, widely used in empirical literature 
on the value relevance of accounting as follows:  
  
                                                             
10 The results with the regression model with the level of CEO bonus compensation (Bonus) as the dependent variable and the level of return on 
assets as our main independent variables are qualitatively similar to our main regression results. 
11 The results with alternative measures of return on asset by using different incomes such as net income and comprehensive income are not 
qualitatively different from our main regression results.   
12 Institutions report their holdings in the 13F filings every quarter. Hence, December 2003 is the most recent quarter-end that is one year before 
February 2005. 
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𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄&,( 	D 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛&,(FG H = 𝛽+ + 𝛽- × 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑆𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑦	D𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠	&,( + 𝛽3 × 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑆𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑦	D𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠	&,( +𝜀&,( 											 (3) 
 
where Q is the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q, computed by market value of assets divided by book value of assets for 
firm i in year t; Return
i,t 
is the annualized stock return for firm i in year t; Non-Sticky DBonus
i,t
 is DBonus
i,t
 if the time-
series regression estimate for ∆NROA of equation (1) for firm i is greater than its mean value of our final sample and 
0 otherwise; and Sticky DBonus
i,t
 is DBonus
i,t
 if the time-series regression estimate for ∆NROA of equation (1) for firm 
i is less than its mean value of our final sample and 0 otherwise. Thus, if stock investors discount the sticky bonus 
compensation as we hypothesize in HI, the coefficient of β2 will be insignificant conditioned on significantly positive 
β1. 
 
Furthermore, we test HII-b by decomposing Sticky DBonus
i,t
 in Equation (2) into those with and without high 
institutional ownership as seen Equation (4).  
 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄&,( 	O 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡𝑜𝑟 P = 𝛽+ + 𝛽- × 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑆𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑦	D𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠	&,( + 𝛽3 × 𝑤 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ	𝐼𝑂 + 𝛽: ×𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑆𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑦	D𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠	&,( 	𝑤/	𝐿𝑜𝑤	𝐼𝑂 + 𝜀&,( 		 (4) 
 
where Sticky DBonus
i,t
 w/ High IO is Sticky ∆Bonus if IO is 1 and 0 otherwise; ; and other variables are as defined in 
Equation 1; Sticky DBonus
i,t
 w/ Low IO is Sticky ∆Bonus if IO is 0 and 0 otherwise; ; and other variables are as defined 
in Equation 2. In light of HII-b, institutional ownership is expected to mitigate the possible negative effect of sticky 
CEO compensation on firm value. Thus, the β2 coefficient Equation (4) is expected to be significant and positive given 
that the β3 coefficient remains insignificant. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for the full 1993–2015 sample. The average of ΔBonus, or the rate of change in 
CEOs’ cash bonus compensation, is 0.100, representing a 10% increase from the previous period. The mean values of 
ΔPROA and ΔNROA are positive (0.313) and negative (-0.280), respectively, as consistent with their definitions. The 
mean value of IO is 0.839, indicating that 83.9% of firm-year observations in our final sample are highly invested by 
institutions. It may because our sample firms consist of relatively large-sized firms listed on S&P 1500 index. The 
mean of Non-Sticky ∆Bonus (0.058) is greater than it of Sticky ∆Bonus (0.042) as they defined. Interestingly, the mean 
of Sticky ∆Bonus w/ High IO (0.046) is greater than it of Sticky ∆Bonus w/ Low IO (0.011), implying that high 
institutional ownership alleviates the CEO bonus stickiness.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of dependent/independent variables 
 N Mean Median Std. Dev. Q1 Q3 
Dependent variables       
∆Bonus 6,748 0.100 0.118 0.694 -0.188 0.456 
TobinQ 6,721 1.695 1.176 1.863 0.691 2.011 
Return 5,697 0.170 0.121 0.393 -0.101 0.388 
Independent variables       
∆PROA 6,748 0.313 0.039 0.610 0.000 0.352 
∆NROA 6,748 -0.280 0.000 0.621 -0.275 0.000 
IO 6,748 0.839 1.000 0.368 1.000 1.000 
Non-Sticky ∆Bonus 6,748 0.058 0.000 0.519 0.000 0.141 
Sticky ∆Bonus 6,748 0.042 0.000 0.466 0.000 0.095 
Sticky ∆Bonus w/ High IO 6,748 0.046 0.000 0.477 0.000 0.031 
Sticky ∆Bonus w/ Low IO 6,748 0.011 0.000 0.206 0.000 0.000 
∆Asset 6,748 0.130 0.091 0.186 0.011 0.208 
∆Sale 6,748 0.125 0.103 0.174 0.023 0.211 
∆I_ROA 6,748 0.058 0.272 2.580 -0.547 1.207 
Note: This table summarizes the descriptive statistics of the dependent/independent variables investigated for the empirical analysis of this study. 
It presents the number of observations, mean, median, standard deviation, 25th percentile, and 75th percentile values. The four databases used in 
this study are Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP), COMPUSTAT, Execucomp, and Thomson Financial over the period of 1993-
2015. Variables shown in this table are defined in Appendix. 
 
 
Correlations 
 
Table 2 presents the Pearson (above the diagonal) and Spearman (below the diagonal) correlations among of the 
dependent/independent variables of our interest investigated for the empirical analysis of this study. It firstly shows 
that ΔBonus is positively correlated with ∆PROA and ∆NROA, respectively though the correlation between ΔBonus 
and ∆PROA is stronger than it between ΔBonus and ∆NROA. The difference confirms the existence of the downward 
compensation stickiness in our sample firms. Second, it also shows that IO is positively correlated with ∆NROA while 
the correlation between IO and ∆PROA is not statistically significant, indicating that institutions play a role of 
alleviating the downward compensation stickiness. Third, in terms of the effect of compensation stickiness on firm 
valuation, ΔBonus is positively correlated with TobinQ and Return, respectively, implying that stock market investors 
positively evaluate high sensitive CEO bonus compensation. However, it also shows that the positive correlation 
between ΔBonus and TobinQ (or Return) is greater for Non-Sticky ΔBonus than Sticky ΔBonus as confirmed by the 
stronger correlation between Non-Sticky ΔBonus and TobinQ (or Return) than the correlation between Sticky ΔBonus 
and TobinQ (or Return). Moreover, Sticky ∆Bonus w/ High IO is positively correlated with TobinQ and Return, 
respectively, and the correlations are stronger than those among Sticky ∆Bonus w/ Low IO, TobinQ and Return, 
implying that the negative effect of sticky CEO compensation is alleviated by the monitoring of institutions. 
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Table 2. Correlation matrix 
# Variables N 1 2 3 4 5 
1 ∆Bonus 6,748 
 0.041 0.045 0.141 0.120 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
2 TobinQ 6,721 0.049 
 -0.003 0.018 0.103 
(0.000)  (0.826) (0.133) (0.000) 
3 Return 5,697 0.054 -0.003 
 0.017 0.029 
(0.000) (0.813)  (0.188) (0.028) 
4 ∆PROA 6,748 0.245 0.041 0.056 
 0.231 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) 
5 ∆NROA 6,748 0.230 0.143 0.074 0.853 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
6 IO 6,748 -0.022 0.099 0.025 -0.005 0.015 (0.066) (0.000) (0.057) (0.683) (0.207) 
7 Non-Sticky ∆Bonus 6,748 0.610 0.061 0.043 0.177 0.209 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
8 Sticky ∆Bonus 6,748 0.683 0.030 0.038 0.148 0.125 (0.000) (0.013) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
9 Sticky ∆Bonus w/ High IO 6,748 0.613 0.031 0.038 0.139 0.118 (0.000) (0.011) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
10 Sticky ∆Bonus w/ Low IO 6,748 0.251 0.013 0.004 0.044 0.042 (0.000) (0.302) (0.768) (0.000) (0.001) 
 
# Variables N 6 7 8 9 10 
1 ∆Bonus 6,748 -0.019 0.017 0.741 0.680 0.290 (0.111) (0.175) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
2 TobinQ 6,721 0.041 -0.012 0.020 0.022 -0.002 (0.001) (0.339) (0.102) (0.065) (0.864) 
3 Return 5,697 0.021 0.020 0.029 0.029 -0.001 (0.118) (0.123) (0.031) (0.029) (0.920) 
4 ∆PROA 6,748 -0.010 0.045 0.095 0.097 0.014 (0.431) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.243) 
5 ∆NROA 6,748 0.048 -0.002 0.029 0.033 -0.005 (0.000) (0.848) (0.019) (0.007) (0.705) 
6 IO 6,748 
 -0.021 -0.011 0.042 -0.126 
 (0.091) (0.359) (0.001) (0.000) 
7 Non-Sticky ∆Bonus 6,748 -0.008 -0.255 -0.010 -0.009 -0.005 (0.517) (0.000) (0.410) (0.473) (0.682) 
8 Sticky ∆Bonus 6,748 -0.019 0.229 
 0.917 0.393 
(0.114) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
9 Sticky ∆Bonus w/ High IO 6,748 0.087 0.191 0.908 
 -0.005 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.660) 
10 Sticky ∆Bonus w/ Low IO 6,748 -0.211 0.089 0.394 -0.018 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.131)  
 
 
Estimates for CCS 
 
We adopt CCS, defined as lower PPS when performance declines to mitigate the aforementioned biases. The degree 
of CCS reflects the magnitude of CEOs’ extracted rents. 
 
Table 3 notes the CCS estimates. Models 1 and 2 present the coefficient estimates for the OLS regression model. For 
Equation (1), we run both the basic sticky model (considering only year-fixed and industry-fixed effects) and the 
controlled model (with all controls). The results of Models 1 and 2 in Table 3 indicate an asymmetric compensation 
change relative to the ROA change from year t – 1 to year t. That is, the coefficients on ∆PROA and ∆NROA are all 
significantly positive but the coefficient on ∆PROA is greater than the coefficient on ∆NROA. The difference is also 
statistically confirmed by the F-value at the bottom. Models 3 and 4 in Table 4 present the coefficient estimates for 
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the Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression,13 indicating that the results are qualitatively similar in both the basic 
sticky and controlled models. The results also note significantly positive coefficients on ∆PROA and ∆NROA though 
the coefficient on ∆PROA is greater than the coefficient on ∆NROA. This reconfirms that pay-for-performance 
sensitivity is greater for firms that outperform than those that underperform. The CCS phenomenon is robust regarding 
our estimation methods, consistent with results in the literature (e.g., Garvey & Milbourn, 2006; Jackson et al., 2008). 
 
 
Table 3. Revisiting the pay-for-performance sensitivity 
Independent variables 
Dependent variable: ∆Bonus 
OLS regression Fama-McBeth regression 
[Model 1] [Model 2] [Model 3] [Model 4] 
∆PROA 0.138 (9.81)*** 0.130 (9.18)*** 0.108 (3.57)*** 0.101 (3.05)*** 
∆NROA 0.094 (6.77)*** 0.084 (6.08)*** 0.086 (3.36)*** 0.079 (3.05)*** 
∆Asset   0.041 (0.72)   0.122 (1.90)* 
∆Sale   0.319 (5.13)***   0.253 (2.60)** 
∆I_ROA   -0.003 (-0.96)   0.491 (1.65) 
Intercept -0.029 (-0.35) -0.040 (-0.49) 0.015 (0.12) 0.050 (0.15) 
Year-fixed-effects Yes  Yes  No  No  
Fama-French 48 Industry -Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 6,748  6,748  6,748  6,748  
Adjusted-R2 0.053 
 
0.059 
 
- 
 
-  
F-value from the test: ∆PROA - ∆NROA > 0  [4.07]**  [4.23]**     
Note: This table reports the conventional pay-for-performance sensitivities based on 6,748 firm-year observations over the period of 1993-2015. 
The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Variables shown in this table are defined in Appendix. ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
The Effects of Institutional Governance on CCS 
 
Table 4 presents the univariate and multivariate results examining the impact of institutional monitoring on 
compensation stickiness. Panel A of Table 4 shows the result of univariate t-test comparing the level of compensation 
stickiness, as measured by the time-series regression estimate for ∆NROA of Equation (1) for firm i, between firms 
with high and low institutional ownerships. It shows that the coefficient on ∆NROA is greater for the firms with high 
institutional ownerships than those with low institutional ownerships, implying that institutions alleviate the 
downward compensation stickiness as we expect.   
 
Panel B of Table 4 shows the multivariate regression results. Before estimating Equation (2). We perform subsample 
analyses by dividing our sample into those with high and low institutional ownership. The regression results are 
presented in Models 1 and 2 in Table 4. The coefficients of ∆NROA in Models 1 and 2 are all significantly positive 
while the coefficient in Model 1 is greater than in Model 2. The difference address that institutions play a role of 
alleviating the downward compensation stickiness. It is also confirmed by the result in Model 3. The coefficient on 
∆NROA*IO is significantly positive, confirming that institutions accelerate the relation between ∆NROA and ∆Bonus. 
Overall, all these results indicate that CEO compensation for performance is less sticky in firms with a higher 
concentration of institutional ownership.  
 
  
                                                             
13 We estimate separate annual regressions following Fama and MacBeth (1973) to alleviate the standard errors stemming from cross-sectional 
dependence. 
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Table 4. Impact of institutional monitoring on compensation stickiness 
Panel A: Univariate t-test 
w/ High IO w/ Low IO Difference 
N Mean N Mean High-Low (t-stat) 
5,659 0.4844 1,089 0.4564 0.028 (1.69)* 
 
Panel B: OLS regression results 
Independent variables 
Dependent variable: ∆Bonus 
w/ High IO w/ Low IO Full sample 
[Model 1] [Model 2] [Model 3] 
∆PROA 0.147 (9.48)*** 0.052 (1.48) 0.042 (1.26) 
∆NROA 0.097 (6.09)*** 0.054 (1.79)* 0.045 (1.59) 
IO     -0.053 (-1.84)* 
∆PROA*IO     0.105 (2.83)*** 
∆NROA*IO     0.054 (1.69)* 
∆Asset 0.029 (0.46) 0.137 (1.01) 0.044 (0.76) 
∆Sale 0.390 (5.59)*** 0.018 (0.12) 0.316 (5.07)*** 
∆I_ROA -0.003 (-0.81) -0.002 (-0.22) -0.003 (-0.88) 
Intercept -0.029 (-0.33) -0.318 (-1.02) 0.008 (0.09) 
Year-fixed-effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Fama-French 48 Industry -Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 5,659  1,089  6,748  
Adjusted-R2 0.069  0.014  0.061  
Note: This table presents the results examining the impact of institutional monitoring on compensation stickiness. Panels A and B show the 
estimation results from univariate t-test and OLS regression analysis, respectively. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Variables shown in 
this table are defined in Appendix.  ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Value Relevance of CCS 
 
Table 5 presents the estimation results for Equation (3) and (4). Panels A and B use TobinQ and Return as the 
dependent variable, respectively. In Panel A, Model 1 shows that the coefficient on ∆Bonus is significantly positive, 
implying that stock market participants positively evaluate sensitive CEO bonus compensation. Then, we decompose 
∆Bonus into sticky and non-sticky ∆Bonus by using the time-series regression estimate for ∆NROA of equation (1) 
for firm i. The regression results is presented in Model 2. It shows that the coefficient on Non-Sticky ∆Bonus is 
significantly positive while the coefficient on Sticky ∆Bonus is not statistically significant, indicating that the positive 
evaluation on sensitive CEO bonus compensation by stock market investors are mainly driven by non-sticky CEO 
bonus compensation. Finally, we decompose the Sticky ∆Bonus once again into those with high (Sticky ∆Bonus w/ 
High IO) and low institutional ownerships (Sticky ∆Bonus w/ Low IO). Given that stock market investors discount the 
Sticky CEO bonus compensation, the significantly positive coefficient on Sticky ∆Bonus w/ High IO implies that the 
discount is alleviated by the institutional investors’ monitoring effect. Similar results are also found in Panel B with 
Return as the dependent variable. That is, the coefficient on ∆Bonus is significantly positive in Model 1 but it is only 
significant for Non-Sticky ∆Bonus in Model 2. Also, the coefficient on Sticky ∆Bonus w/ High IO is significantly 
positive while the coefficient on Sticky ∆Bonus w/ Low IO is not statistically significant. In sum, our empirical analyses 
confirm the negative valuation on sticky CEO compensation structure by stock market investors and the role of active 
monitoring by institutional shareholders in mitigating both CEO compensation stickiness and its value-deteriorating 
effect. 
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Table 5. Value relevance of compensation stickiness 
Panel A: Dependent variables is TobinQ 
Independent variables [Model 1] [Model 2] [Model 3] 
∆Bonus 0.109 (3.61)***  
   
Non-Sticky ∆Bonus  
 
0.168 (3.76)*** 0.168 (3.76)*** 
Sticky ∆Bonus  
 
0.062 (1.54)  
 
Sticky ∆Bonus w/ High IO  
   0.078 (1.79)* 
Sticky ∆Bonus w/ Low IO  
   -0.028 (-0.27) 
Intercept 1.821 (8.82)*** 1.825 (8.84)*** 1.822 (8.83)*** 
N 6,721  6,721  6,721  
Adjusted-R2 0.185  0.186  0.186  
 
Panel B: Dependent variables is Return 
Independent variables [Model 1] [Model 2] [Model 3] 
∆Bonus 0.015 (2.08)**    
 
Non-Sticky ∆Bonus  
 
0.018 (1.65)* 0.031 (2.73)*** 
Sticky ∆Bonus  
 
0.013 (1.35)  
 
Sticky ∆Bonus w/ High IO  
   0.022 (2.21)** 
Sticky ∆Bonus w/ Low IO     -0.009 (-0.10) 
Intercept 0.045 (0.91) 0.045 (0.92) 0.167 (31.91)*** 
N 5,697  5,697  5,697 
 
Adjusted-R2 0.056  0.056  0.002  
Note: This table presents the results examining the value relevance of compensation stickiness. Panels A and B show the estimation results with 
TobinQ and Return as the dependent variables, respectively. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Variables shown in this table are defined 
in Appendix.  ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Robustness Tests 
 
So far, we measure CEO compensation stickiness by using the absolute value of the time-series regression estimate 
for ∆NROA of Equation (1) for firm i, following Jackson et al. (2008)’s model. As a robustness test, we alternatively 
define CEO compensation stickiness by using following regression model.  
 
D𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠&,( = 𝛽+ + 𝛽- × D𝑅𝑂𝐴&,( + 𝛽3 × 𝐷𝐷&( + 𝛽: × D𝑅𝑂𝐴&,( × 𝐷𝐷&( + S𝛽4 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠&,( + 𝜀&,( (5) 
 
where DBonusi,t is the natural logarithm of (CEO bonus compensation / lagged CEO bonus compensation) for firm i 
in year t; DROAi,t is the natural logarithm for (return on assets / lagged return on assets) for firm i in year t; and DDi,t 
is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the return on assets in year t is lower than 1 in year t – 1, and 0 otherwise. Controlsi,t 
is defined as the same in Equation (1). In this equation, conditional on a significantly positive coefficient β1, a 
significantly negative β3 coefficient suggests compensation stickiness, indicating a smaller compensation reaction 
when ROA decreases, comparing to when ROA increases. Therefore, we create Stickiness, a dummy variable whose 
value is equal to 1 if the time-series regression estimate for DROA*DD in Equation (5) for firm i is less than or equal 
to 0, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Then, we re-estimate the Equations (3) and (4) with the alternative stickiness measure. Table 6 presents the regression 
results. Consistent with the results in Table 5, the result in Model 1 shows that the coefficient on ∆Bonus is 
significantly positive, implying that stock market participants positively evaluate sensitive CEO bonus compensation. 
In Model 2, we find that the coefficient on Non-Sticky ∆Bonus is significantly positive while the coefficient on Sticky 
∆Bonus is not statistically significant, indicating that stock market investors discount the sticky CEO bonus 
compensation. Finally, Model 3 addresses that the coefficient on Sticky ∆Bonus w/ High IO becomes significantly 
positive while the coefficient on Sticky ∆Bonus w/ Low IO remain insignificant. It implies that the discount on sticky 
CEO bonus compensation by stock market investors is alleviated by the institutional investors’ monitoring effect. 
 
  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2018 Volume 34, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 320 The Clute Institute 
Table 6. Value relevance of Stickiness by using another definition 
 Dependent variables: TobinQ 
Independent variables [Model 1] [Model 2] [Model 3] 
∆Bonus 0.110 (3.36)***  
   
Non-Sticky ∆Bonus  
 
0.173 (3.59)*** 0.029 (2.66)*** 
Sticky ∆Bonus  
 
0.057 (1.28)  
 
Sticky ∆Bonus w/ High IO  
   0.024 (2.36)** 
Sticky ∆Bonus w/ Low IO  
   -0.112 (-1.09) 
Intercept 1.684 (73.36)*** 1.684 (73.38)*** 0.168 (31.93)*** 
N 6,748  6,748  6,748  
Adjusted-R2 0.002  0.071  0.002  
Note: By defining compensation stickiness from Table 5, this table presents the results examining the value relevance of compensation stickiness. 
In this table, stickiness is alternatively calculated by using the time-series regression estimate for DROA *DD of equation (5) for firm i. The t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. Variables shown in this table are defined in Appendix.  ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The literature (Hartzell & Starks, 2003; Almazan et al., 2005) suggests that institutional ownership concentration is 
positively associated with sensitivity to CEO compensation. Extending this finding to address the substantial problem 
of sticky CEO compensation, we posit that active monitoring by institutional shareholders, contrary to the optimal 
contracting theory, alleviates the deteriorating effect of sticky compensation arrangements on shareholder wealth. 
 
Our primary findings are as follows: First, our panel regression results indicate that CEO compensation stickiness has 
a significantly negative association with Tobin’s Q and annualized stock returns. This implies that sticky compensation 
arrangements reduce shareholder wealth. Second, we find that a higher concentration of institutional ownership 
induces lower CCS, indicating that institutional shareholders play an active monitoring role in sticky compensation 
arrangements. Finally, we conduct a panel regression using a modified specification with an institutional interaction 
term. The findings are consistent with the prediction that institutional ownership alleviates the aggravating effect of 
CCS on firm value.  
 
Our results collectively lend empirical support to the active-monitoring hypothesis, which states that institutional 
shareholders mitigate both compensation stickiness and its value-deteriorating effect. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Definition of dependent/independent variables 
Dependent variables  
DBonus Natural logarithm of (CEO bonus compensation / lagged CEO bonus compensation) for firm i in year t. 
TobinQ Industry adjusted Tobin’s Q computed by market value of assets divided by book value of assets for firm i in year t. 
Return Annualized cumulative stock return for firm i in year t. 
Independent variables  
∆PROA 
DROA if DROA > 0, and 0 otherwise. DROA is defined as the natural logarithm of (return on 
assets / lagged return on assets) for firm i in year t where return on asset (ROA) is calculated as 
income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total asset. 
∆NROA 
DROA if DROA < 0, and 0 otherwise. DROA is defined as the natural logarithm of (return on 
assets / lagged return on assets) for firm i in year t where ROA is calculated as income before 
extraordinary items divided by lagged total asset. 
IO 1 if institutional ownership is greater than its mean from the Thomson Financial over the period of 1993-2015 and 0 otherwise. 
Non-Sticky ∆Bonus DBonus if the time-series regression estimate for ∆NROA of Equation (1) for firm i is greater than its mean value and 0 otherwise.   
Sticky ∆Bonus DBonus if the time-series regression estimate for ∆NROA of Equation (1) for firm i is less than its mean value and 0 otherwise. 
Sticky ∆Bonus w/ High IO Sticky ∆Bonus if IO is 1 and 0 otherwise. 
Sticky ∆Bonus w/ Low IO Sticky ∆Bonus if IO is 0 and 0 otherwise. 
∆Asset Natural logarithm of (book value of assets / lagged book value of assets) for firm i in year t. 
∆Sale Natural logarithm of (sales / lagged sales) for firm i in year t. 
∆I_ROA Industry average of natural logarithm of (return on assets / lagged return on assets) for firm i in year t. 
Note: This table describes the definitions of key variables in this study. Firm characteristics are obtained from the CRSP and COMPUSTAT 
databases, executive pay is from Execucomp, and institutional ownership is from Thomson Financial over the period of 1993-2015The sample 
excludes financial and utility firms. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent level. 
 
